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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Hwesu S. Murray, a television network employee, ap-
proached a television network executive with some ideas for future
television series. The executive told Murray to submit the ideas in
writing. Murray complied, submitting five ideas, and the executive
asked him to "flesh out" one of the proposals entitled "Father's
Day."' Once again, Murray complied, submitting a proposal for a
half-hour situation comedy which would star Bill Cosby and would
focus on the family life of a black American family. Murray informed
the executive that if the network used the proposal he expected to
1. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 990 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
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receive compensation and to be named the executive producer.2
The network rejected the proposal. But four years later, the net-
work, NBC, premiered The Cosby Show, which starred Bill Cosby and
focused on the everyday life of an upper middle-class black American
family. Murray immediately wrote the network, claiming that The
Cosby Show was derived from "Father's Day." The network dis-
agreed, arguing that the show developed from Bill Cosby's humor
and was produced by an independent production company.S
Murray sued NBC, claiming the network misappropriated his idea.
Should Murray's idea be entitled to legal protection? The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals said "no," affirming the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the network.4
At about the same time, Mark Landsberg wrote a book about strat-
egies for winning at the Scrabble board game. When he requested
permission to use the Scrabble trademark, the trademark owner re-
quested a copy of the manuscript. Landsberg complied, but subse-
quent negotiations for permission failed. Later, the trademark
owner released its own Scrabble strategy book.5
Landsberg sued the trademark owner, claiming copyright infringe-
ment and breach of contract. Should Landsberg's idea of a strategy
book for Scrabble be entitled to legal protection? The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals said "yes," rejecting his copyright claim but af-
firming the district court's finding of an implied contract. 6
These two cases illustrate the unpredictability in an area of the law
known as "idea law." 7 This Note will analyze the development of
idea law within the traditional areas of intellectual property. It also
will examine the theories currently being used to protect ideas, dis-
cuss the "novelty" and "concreteness" criteria, and explore the issue
of preemption. Finally, based on recent case law and scholarly writ-
ings, it will predict how idea law will develop in the future and will
recommend procedures which will protect the respective rights of
the parties involved and prevent unnecessary litigation.
II. HISTORICAL PROTECTION OF IDEAS
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to "promote
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 992.
5. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1195-
96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1986).
6. Id. at 1196.
7. See Margreth Barrett, The "Law of Ideas" Reconsidered, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y. 691, 691 (1989). Idea law is applicable to all types of ideas, including
literary, business, and scientific ideas. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.01, at 16-3 n.7 (1990) [hereinafter NIMMER].
[Vol. 18
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries." 8 Almost immediately following the
ratification of the Constitution, Congress enacted a patent statute
and a copyright statute.9 In addition, the areas of trademarks, trade
secrets, and unfair competition have evolved and developed both by
statute and by common law. These five areas became known collec-
tively as "intellectual property."1o
Traditionally, these areas provided no protection for what is com-
monly called an "undeveloped idea."" As Justice Brandeis ob-
served, "[t]he general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and
ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the
air to common use."' 2 Around the turn of this century, however,
courts began to confront the need to reconcile the public's interest
in having access to new ideas with the apparent injustice of permit-
ting someone to exploit the ideas of others.' 3 As California
Supreme Court Justice Schauer wrote:
Generally speaking, ideas are as free as the air and as speech and
the senses, and as potent or weak, interesting or drab, as the exper-
iences, philosophies, vocabularies, and other variables of speaker
and listener may combine to produce, to portray, or to compre-
hend. But there can be circumstances when neither air nor ideas
may be acquired without cost. The diver who goes deep in the sea,
even as the pilot who ascends high into the troposphere, knows full
well that for life itself he, or someone on his behalf, must arrange
for air (or its respiration-essential element, oxygen) to be specially
provided at the time and place of need. The theatrical producer
likewise may be dependent for his business life on the procurement
of ideas from other persons as well as the dressing up and portrayal
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. The patent and copyright statutes were first enacted in 1790. The Patent Act
has been revised three times (in 1793, 1836, and 1952) while the Copyright Act has
been revised four times (in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976). See ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS 8, 283 (1983).
10. See Barrett, supra note 7, at 691-92. The logic behind grouping these areas
together has been questioned by at least one commentator: "Except for tradition and
the fact that the.. . subjects are commonly taught together in one survey course, one
might question why a single book should include these ...divergent subjects."
MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 9, at 1
11. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE Doc-
TRINES 35 (1973) (analyzing the rights in undeveloped ideas). The term "undevel-
oped idea" is in fact a misnomer. An idea will not be protected unless it is concrete,
and the term "concrete" is often defined as "developed."
12. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.01, at 16-2 to 16-3.
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of his self-conceptions; he may not find his own sufficient for
survival. 14
Eventually, courts developed various theories under which an idea
originator could recover either the value of the idea or the value of
"the services in providing the idea." 15 These theories are generally
divided into five categories: property, express contract, implied con-
tract, quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, and confidential relation-
ship.16 The first theory is concerned solely with the nature of the
idea to be protected, while the other four theories focus on the rela-
tionship between the idea originator (usually the plaintiff) and the
person or entity to whom the idea is disclosed (usually the defend-
ant). These theories were once highly regarded,17 but now are often
criticized as being "haphazard and generally lacking in both internal
coherence and overall focus."' 8
III. PRESENT PROTECTION OF IDEAS
The need to protect an idea usually arises after the idea has been
disclosed to another party. Before an idea is disclosed, the other
party-usually a publisher, producer, or manufacturer-is, under-
standably, quite hesitant to promise compensation or secrecy for the
idea. Consequently, the idea usually is disclosed after the other
party makes an ambiguous promise to "make satisfactory arrange-
ments" if the idea is used or to "not tell anyone" if it is not used.
Due in part to a strong federal policy against protecting unpatent-
able ideas,' 9 courts usually require the plaintiff to show that the rela-
tionship between the two parties is sufficient to permit a court to
apply one of the five theories of protection. 20 Courts also require
that the idea be novel and concrete and the defendant's use be unau-
thorized.21 Finally, courts analyze patent and copyright laws to de-
termine whether these federal statutes preempt the plaintiff's
claim.22
14. Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1956); see also H. CLARKE ANAWALT,
IDEAS IN THE WORKPLACE-PLANNING FOR PROTECTION 4 (1988) ("[W]hile no one re-
ally owns ideas, the products of ideas may be owned and protected by law.").
15. Barrett, supra note 7, at 692-93.
16. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, §§ 16.02-.06; Barrett, supra note 7, at 693.
17. See, e.g., Harold C. Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw.
U.L. REV. 295 (1954); GeorgeJ. Kuehnl, Liability from the Use of Submitted Ideas, 13 Bus.
LAw. 90 (1957).
18. Barrett, supra note 7, at 691.
19. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1946);
see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.01, at 16-4.
22. See infra notes 126-161 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18
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A. The Five Theories of Protecting Ideas
1. The Property Theory
The property theory is the least accepted of the five theories.
23
Indeed, some commentators argue that an idea simply cannot be
owned. 24 Other scholars and judges try to argue away the courts'
recognition of the property theory. 2 5 These arguments ignore the
reality that some courts have, in fact, expressly recognized property
rights in ideas.26
For example, the plaintiff in Belt v. Hamilton National Bank
2 7
worked in the advertising business. He conceived an idea for a radio
program2 8 and sought financial support from the defendant bank.
The bank agreed to sponsor the program and hired the plaintiff to
prepare the program. The bank subsequently cancelled the agree-
ment and abandoned the project, but revived it some time later and
hired another advertising agency to produce it. The plaintiff sued
the bank for the value of his idea.
2 9
The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him $3,300. After the
bank moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court
framed the issue accordingly: "The plaintiff sued for compensation
for the use of his idea. In equity and good conscience he should be
paid. Does the law provide a remedy? The principal question
presented is whether there is a property right in an idea and, if so, to
what extent." 30 The court denied the bank's motion, finding that the
law gave effect to a property right in an idea even though the idea
23. The United States Supreme Court discussed the concept of property in infor-
mation in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In his
dissent in that case, Justice Brandeis pointed out that "[a]n essential element of indi-
vidual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it." Id. at 250
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., ANAWALT, supra note 14, at 3 ("No one 'owns' ideas. Ownership is a
legal concept which indicates that one has a claim of right or of property to a certain
matter. As a general proposition, you simply cannot 'own' an idea.").
25. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 7, at 736 ("[N]otwithstanding numerous case and
secondary source references to a 'property theory' for idea recovery, there is very
little evidence that such a theory in fact is applied by the courts."); see also Vantage
Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("And
while the idea disclosure cases generally refer to the idea in suit as the plaintiff's
claimed 'property,' the decisions have focused primarily on the relationship between
the parties (or lack thereof) and not on any a priori recognition of exclusivity in the
idea."), aft'd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
26. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162-63
(1989) (recognizing the "inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas").
27. 108 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
28. Id. at 689.
29. Id. at 689-90.
30. Id. at 690.
1992]
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was neither patentable nor subject to copyright.3I The court also
required that an idea be "reduced to a concrete detailed form" and
be "novel" before it can receive the protection of the law.32
The court of appeals affirmed.SS Although it found no precedent
in its own jurisdiction, the court considered decisions from other
courts and was convinced that a person has a property right in his
own idea which enables him to recover damages for its appropria-
tion.S4 The court expounded on the criteria for finding a property
right in an idea:
An abstract idea, in any event when not the subject of a contract, is
so unattached as to be deemed legally without the quality of indi-
vidual identity or property. Protection of ideas at all, in contrast
with inventions, literary productions and trade secrets, the law with
respect to which we do not now consider, must be careful to avoid
attributing to individual ownership that which is in reality common
property; and it would be unwise to place a burden upon communi-
cation of ideas by requiring compensation for their adoption and
use. But the dangers suggested are sufficiently avoided to warrant
the law in placing an idea among protected property rights when it
is definite and concrete, new and novel, has usefulness and is dis-
closed for commercial purposes in circumstances which the parties
ought reasonably to construe as contemplating compensation for
its use.
3 5
An entire line of cases involving television and radio formatsS6 has
31. Id. at 691. Some scholars ignore or try to argue away the courts' express
recognition of the property theory. For example, Barrett suggests that the court in
Belt did not adopt the property theory, but merely failed to specify what theory it was
applying. Barrett, supra note 7, at 701.
32. Belt, 108 F. Supp. at 691. The court found support in three cases: Liggett &
Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1935); Howard J.
Ryan & Assocs., Inc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 55 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Wash. 1936);
and Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 1950). The
Belt court found its strongest support in Meyer:
"While we recognize that an abstract idea as such may not be the subject of
a property right, yet, when it takes upon itself the concrete form which we
find in the instant case, it is our opinion that it then becomes a property
right subject to sale. Of course, it must be something novel and new; in
other words, one cannot claim any right in the multiplication table."
Belt, 108 F. Supp. at 691 (quoting Meyer, 194 N.E. at 210).
33. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
34. Id. at 708.
35. Id. at 708-09. Interestingly, Barrett quotes this language as support for her
proposition that the Belt decisions (district court and court of appeals) were based on
an implied contract theory rather than a property theory. See Barrett, supra note 7, at
701 n.54.
36. A "format" has a specific definition in the entertainment industry:
The term "Format" means a written presentation which sets forth the
framework of the serial or episodic series within which the central running
characters will operate and which framework is intended to be repeated in
each episode, the setting, theme, premise or general story line of the pro-
[Vol. 18
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been decided primarily on the property theory.37 For example, in
Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd.,38 the defendant asked the
plaintiff to submit a presentation for a television show. The plain-
tiff's proposal, tentatively entitled "The Coward," centered around a
World War II lieutenant who was labeled a coward when he surren-
dered his company to the enemy. After the war, he became a police-
man who performed feats of bravery to overcome this label.39
The defendant rejected the proposal, but five years later began to
broadcast Branded, a series which centered around an "Old West"
calvary officer who was "branded" a coward after surviving an Indian
battle where the rest of his company perished. In each episode of
Branded, the central character performed feats of bravery to over-
come this label.40
The trial court dismissed the action, but the California Court of
Appeal reversed. The appellate court held that common-law copy-
right could protect the plaintiff's ideas so long as the ideas were suf-
ficiently novel and concrete.4' The court recognized that it was
extending protection to an uncertain middle ground, but the plain-
tiff's ideas were sufficiently developed and concrete to warrant fur-
ther review.42
Legal philosophers also have acknowledged the existence of prop-
erty rights in ideas. While recognizing that "the moral rights be-
tween persons which pertain to their ideas is a matter on which even
the boldest and most confident writers on property have shown un-
common caution," Andrew Wengraf argues that well-known scholar
posed serial or episodic series and the central running characters which are
distinct and identifiable including detailed characterizations and the inter-
play of such characters. It may also include one or more suggested story
lines for individual episodes.
Barrett, supra note 7, at 705 n.68 (quoting Writers Guild of America, 1960 Television
Film Basic Agreement, as modified by memorandum of June 15, 1966, regarding
1966 WGA TV Film Negotiations, art. l(i)(aa)).
37. See, e.g., Szczesny v. W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Corp., 315 N.E.2d 263
(Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Silver v. Television City, Inc., 215 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1965). These cases were decided on common-law copyright grounds. As Barrett
points out, however, "[e]xtension of common-law copyright protection to ideas is
conceptually similar to adopting the 'property theory' for finding property rights in
ideas, since most copying is precluded in either case, regardless of the lack of a con-
tractual or confidential relationship between the parties." Barrett, supra note 7, at
707. Since the 1976 Copyright Act purported to eliminate state common-law copy-
rights, the precedential value of these cases is questionable at best.
38. 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970).
39. Id. at 683-84.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 694. For a discussion of the novelty and concreteness criteria, see infra
notes 102-122 and accompanying text.
42. Fink, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
1992]
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Robert Nozick suggests that property rights should include property
in ideas:
Nozick suggests, in particular, that holdings in ideas can be feasibly
handled so as not to run afoul of his "Lockean proviso" concerning
acquisition of unowned entities. He believes that a "free operation
of a market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean pro-
viso" and he includes original inventions, technical discoveries,
and trade secrets as part of this free operation. His remarks and
examples refer to the moral equivalent of patents or private discov-
eries but he apparently leaves the moral status of full-blooded
copyright to be argued either way. The constraints on the moral
right to protection of property in ideas are set by the application of
his Lockean proviso and by the other Lockean rights to liberty
which people possess, which are rights to noninterference with
what persons may do with what they unreservedly hold as property.
It follows that the way in which the proviso works and the connec-
tion between rights to liberty and rights to property are crucial to
Nozick's account. 43
By analyzing Nozick's examples that relate to property rights in
ideas, Professor Wengraf concluded that for Nozick, "the essential
feature of a property right in an idea is the right to determine what
shall be done with that idea."44
While some scholars and judges erroneously try to argue away the
courts' recognition of the property theory, they are correct in assert-
ing that the property theory rarely should be used to protect ideas.
First, the novelty and concreteness criteria preclude the recognition
of property rights in the majority of cases. Second, the preemption
provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act45 and the Patent Act 46 suffi-
ciently eliminate state property right protection in those few cases
that survive the novelty and concreteness scrutiny. Finally, the re-
maining theories of protection require the court to consider the par-
ties' relationship, an element missing under the property theory.
2. The Express Contract Theory
An enforceable express contract arises if the person to whom an
idea is submitted expressly promises to pay for it if the idea is used. 4 7
Consequently, in a well-publicized case, Buchwald v. Paramount Pic-
tures Corp. ,48 Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Harvey A. Schneider
43. Andrew Wengraf, Property in Ideas, 13 LEGAL STUD. F. 341, 341, 341-42
(1989) (citing ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)) (citations
omitted).
44. Id. at 342-43.
45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-104 (1988).
47. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.04, at 16-17.
48. No. C-706083 (Calif. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990), cited in Contracts: Liability for the
[Vol. 18
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concluded that Paramount Pictures breached its contract with hu-
morist Art Buchwald when it released the movie Coming to America,
starring Eddie Murphy. Buchwald had written a story tentatively en-
titled "King for a Day."4 9 Paramount Pictures purchased the rights
to the story and its concept. The contract included a clause entitling
Buchwald to "contingent consideration" if Paramount produced a
full-length movie "based upon" Buchwald's work.50
In a thirty-four-page opinion, the California court acknowledged
that the case did not involve copyright infringement. Thus, it re-
jected Paramount's contention that Buchwald must prove substantial
similarity.5' The court concluded that Coming to America was "based
upon" Buchwald's story within the meaning of the contract, and that
Buchwald and his co-plaintiff, producer Atain Bernstein, were enti-
tled under the contract to $265,000 plus nineteen percent of the
movie's profits.52
Under the express contract theory, a plaintiff should not have to
show novelty and concreteness. 53 This is appropriate since, as the
United States Supreme Court recognized, the enforcement of a con-
tract to pay for an idea may in fact enhance its dissemination to the
public.54 Such a plaintiff may, however, be confronted with two hur-
dles not confronted under the property theory: consideration and
the statute of frauds.
a. Consideration
Most commentators feel that sufficient consideration is found in
the promise to disclose an idea. 55
Use of Buchwald Movie Idea Does Not Require Substantial Similarity, 39 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 205 (Jan. 18, 1990).
49. Contracts: Liability for Use of Buchwald Movie Idea Does Not Require Substantial Simi-
larity, 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 205, 206 (Jan. 18 1990).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 206.
52. Id.; see also Second Round Looms After Buchwald Win, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 22, 1990, at
6, col. 1. Interestingly, Paramount Pictures' attorney insists that his client actually
won since the court rejected Buchwald's tort and punitive damages claims. Id.
53. See, e.g., Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("whether or not the idea is original or concrete, recovery may be
permitted if there was an express promise to pay for its use"); Donahue v. Ziv Televi-
sion Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (1966) ("An idea which can be the subject
matter of a contract need not be novel or concrete."); see also Barrett, supra note 7, at
739- 40.
54. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979); see also Stanley
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting)
("Unlike a copyright, a contract creates no monopoly; it is effective only between the
contracting parties; it does not withdraw the idea from general circulation. Any per-
son not a party to the contract is free to use the idea without restriction.").
55. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.04[A], at 16-18; Barrett, supra note 7, at 738.
1992]
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Even if the idea furnished by plaintiff is not original or novel with
him and even if the idea would have been accessible to defendant
by means other than plaintiff's disclosure, still if in return for plain-
tiff's disclosure defendant promises to pay if he uses the idea and
plaintiff does in fact disclose his idea, then such disclosure should
constitute a valid and binding consideration.
56
Thus, the agreement to disclose the idea is sufficient consideration
to support the contract, so long as there was no preexisting obliga-
tion to do so.
5 7
At least one court, however, determined that consideration was
lacking because the plaintiff had no property right in the idea. In
Masline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. ,58 the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that an idea may be protected by contract, but
the idea must be something new before it can be the basis of consid-
eration.5 9 This decision has been severely criticized. 60 As Professor
Nimmer points out, this decision "seems to ignore the fact that de-
fendant had promised to pay for the idea without conditioning such
promise upon plaintiff's producing an idea which would be regarded
as 'property.' "61
b. The Statute of Frauds
Unless the agreement regarding the idea disclosure is in writing,
the plaintiff may confront a statute of frauds defense, based on either
of two sections of the statute. Neither of these sections should hin-
der the enforcement of the contract.
First, the "sale of goods" section invalidates oral agreements if the
price of the goods sold is $500 or more. A plaintiff should be able to
defeat this defense by arguing that an idea does not constitute
"goods," making this section of the statute inapplicable. 62 Further,
most jurisdictions recognize an exception to this section where the
56. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.04[A], at 16-18 to 16-19.
57. See High v. Trade Union Courier Publishing Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529
(1946) ("While the idea disclosed may be common or even open to public knowl-
edge, yet such disclosure if protected by contract, is sufficient consideration for the
promise to pay.").
58. 112 A. 639 (Conn. 1921).
59. Id. at 641.
60. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.04[A], at 16-18; Barrett, supra note 7, at
738.
61. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.04[A], at 16-18.
62. Id. § 16.04[B], at 16-23 ("[T]he sounder approach would seem to be to re-
gard the transaction as one involving not a sale of an idea but rather a contract for
plaintiff's services in disclosing the idea."). See Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 970 (Cal. 1953) (holding that acceptance of the goods took the
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defendant actually receives and accepts the goods.63
Second, an oral agreement is invalid if it cannot be performed
within a year. 64 A defendant may argue that the promise not to use
the plaintiff's idea without payment of compensation is a negative
covenant of unlimited duration and is therefore incapable of per-
formance within one year.65 A plaintiff should be able to overcome
this defense by arguing for application of the generally accepted ex-
ception in favor of enforcement by a party who has completely per-
formed under the contract. 66
3. The Implied Contract Theory
If the parties do not have an express contract, the idea originator
may be able to recover under an implied contract theory. 67 Theoret-
ically, the only difference between the two theories is that in an ex-
press contract the parties' agreement is expressed through words,
while in an implied contract, the parties' agreement is expressed
through conduct.68 Thus, the rules applicable to express contracts
also should apply to implied contracts. 69 Some courts, however,
have not been so generous. While most courts apply the express
contract rules to implied contracts, some courts hold that an implied
contract cannot be enforced unless the idea satisfies the novelty and
concreteness criteria.70
A court confronted with an implied contract claim must focus on
the relationship between the parties to determine whether an im-
plied contract exists. For example, courts usually will imply a con-
tract where the plaintiff discloses an idea under conditions indicating
63. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1932).
64. Id. §§ 178, 198.
65. See, e.g., Hollywood Motion Picture Equip. Co. v. Furer, 105 P.2d 299, 300
(Cal. 1940) (holding that an oral contract which may be performed within a year is
enforceable). But see Cobb v. Southern Plaswood Corp., 171 F. Supp. 691, 700 (W.D.
Ark. 1959) (applying the Arkansas Statute of Frauds, which invalidates oral contracts
which, by their terms cannot, be performed within one year or which the parties con-
templated no performance within one year).
66. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 198 (1932).
67. See, e.g., Annisgard v. Bray, 419 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
("Although the parties never agreed to the precise form or amount of compensation
to the plaintiff in the event his idea and work were used, the defendants impliedly
assented to pay the plaintiff.").
68. Barrett, supra note 7, at 740 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.05, at 16-
30).
69. Barrett, supra note 7, at 740.
70. See, e.g., Downey v. General Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 1972)
("[W]hen one submits an idea to another, no promise to pay for its use may be im-
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that compensation is expected.7 1 Courts also will rely on industry
custom regarding idea submissions and compensation to imply a
contract.72
The enforceability of an implied contract often hinges on the
method by which the plaintiff transferred the idea to the defendant.
Professor Nimmer has concluded that several methods preclude the
formation of an implied contract. For example, if the defendant ac-
quires the idea from someone other than the plaintiff, or if the de-
fendant involuntarily receives the plaintiff's unsolicited submission,
such as where the plaintiff "blurts out his idea," then an implied con-
tract will not be enforced.7T
On the other hand, an implied contract will be found where the
defendant actually solicited the plaintiff's idea. This was the case in
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., discussed in the intro-
duction.74 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the de-
fendant's book lacked the requisite similarity to infringe the
copyright in the plaintiff's nonfiction work, but the court affirmed
the district court's finding for the plaintiff on the contract claim:
California law allows for recovery for the breach of an implied-in-
fact contract when the recipient of a valuable idea accepts the infor-
mation knowing that compensation is expected, and subsequently
uses the idea without paying for it. If disclosure occurs before it is
known that compensation is a condition of its use, however, no
contract will be implied.75
The method of transferring an idea that appears to give courts the
most difficulty is one where the defendant voluntarily receives an un-
solicited submission. Professor Nimmer suggests that a contract
should not be implied under these circumstances unless the recipient
has an opportunity to reject the submission. If the recipient has such
an opportunity, however, and accepts the submission, a contract may
be implied. 76
71. See, e.g., Annisgard, 419 N.E.2d at 318 ("Once they [defendants] represented
to the plaintiff that they intended to pay him if they used his idea and services, they
were bound to do so when they proceeded to use those ideas and services.").
72. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) ("On the whole, the
record raises a material issue of fact as to whether the appellees accepted Whitfield's
submission on an understanding common in the industry that he expected payment if
the ideas were used."); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204,
1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("I[T]here is support for the proposition that such an implied
agreement may be based upon industry custom or usage regarding submission and
use of ideas.").
73. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.05[A]-[B], at 16-31 to 16-34.
74. 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
75. 802 F.2d at 1196 (citing Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 267, 270 (Cal.
1956)).
76. "[A]ny device which gives the recipient advance warning of and an opportu-
nity to prevent a proposed (non-gratuitious) idea submission will be sufficient to es-
[Vol. 18
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Nimmer also suggests that the implied contract is unilateral (a
promise for an act) rather than bilateral (a promise for a promise).
Under this analysis, the submission constitutes an invitation for an
offer and the failure to reject constitutes an offer for a unilateral con-
tract.77 Courts, however, often consider the plaintiff's submission to
be an offer and the defendant's subsequent use to be the
acceptance. 78
Once a court finds an implied contract, it is confronted with three
additional issues. First, the court must determine the price of the
idea. In an implied contract, the parties usually do not agree upon
the compensation the creator of the idea should receive. Courts,
however, usually imply a reasonable compensation. 79 Indeed, most
courts permit the plaintiff to testify as to the value of his or her serv-
ices in disclosing the idea.80
Second, the court must determine when the contract became bind-
ing on the parties. The contract should be considered binding at the
time the idea is disclosed. This will prevent the defendant from "re-
jecting" the plaintiff's "offer" and then using the idea without fear of
retribution.81 Unfortunately, some courts confuse this point of crea-
tion with the point where the cause of action arises. This confusion
results because contracts implied by courts usually require the de-
fendant to compensate the plaintiff only if the defendant uses the
plaintiff's idea. Thus, the plaintiff has no enforceable claim against
the defendant until the defendant actually uses the idea.82 Thus,
some courts erroneously hold that the contract is not binding until
tablish an implied contract if the recipient then permits the submission to be made."
3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.05[C], at 16-36.1.
77. Id. § 16.05[C], at 16-37.
78. See, e.g., Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1935) (holding that where plaintiff's letter to defendant included the statement,
"I trust that this idea will be of sufficient value as to merit a reasonable charge there-
for[,]" the statement constituted an offer and defendant's use of the idea constituted
acceptance of the offer).
79. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d
1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that damages are limited to the amount parties
would have gained had both parties fully performed their obligations); Cool v. Inter-
national Shoe Co., 142 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1944) (holding reasonable compensa-
tion appropriate where uncertainty exists regarding compensation).
80. See, e.g., Donahue v. United Artists Corp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969)
("California courts have consistently held that an owner of literary property may
properly testify as to its value even if he is not an expert in such matters."); Donahue
v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 140 (1966) (rule that property
owners are permitted to testify as to the property's value applies equally to ideas).
81. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.05[F], at 16-43.
82. McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff cannot
recover for misappropriation of ideas under New York law unless the ideas are actu-
ally used by defendant).
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the cause of action arises.83
Finally, the court must determine when the breach occurred. This
is one of the most difficult issues. This problem is most evident in
the television and motion picture industries.84 For example, does
the breach occur when the defendant incorporates the idea into a
television or movie script, when that script becomes the basis for a
television program or movie, or when the program or movie is first
exhibited to the public?85 While the question is one of fact, most
courts hold that the parties impliedly contracted for a use which "dis-
closed the idea to a substantial segment of the public" since such use
"would certainly destroy any further marketability of the idea." 86
4. The Quasi-Contract Theory
A quasi-contract is not a true contract.87 Rather, it is an equitable
doctrine developed by the courts to prevent unjust enrichment.88
To recover under this theory, a plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant was enriched by using or knowing the idea and that it would be
unjust to permit the defendant to refuse to compensate the plain-
tiff.89 Courts also require the plaintiff to satisfy the novelty and con-
creteness criteria.90 Nevertheless, the courts have not hesitated to
apply the theory to idea submission cases. 9'
83. Id. This interpretation was also suggested by amicus for the defendant in
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 1950).
84. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.05[F], at 16-44.
85. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 491
(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that statute of limitations probably triggered by general pub-
lication rather than limited publication).
86. Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (1961).
87. "[Qjuasi contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent in-
tention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they
promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons ofjustice." Weitzenkorn
v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal. 1953) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 5
cmt. a (1932)).
88. The doctrine of unjust enrichment or recovery in quasi-contract applies to
situations where there is no legal contract, but where "the person sought to be
charged is in possession of money or property which in good conscience and justice
he should not retain, but should deliver to another." Matarese v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, 158 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1946).
89. Werlin v. Readers Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(applying New York law).
90. See, e.g., Official Airlines Schedule Info. Serv., Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
333 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1964) (requiring plaintiff to show that idea was novel,
disclosed in confidence, and that idea was used by defendant); Smith v. Recrion
Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 665 (Nev. 1975) ("An idea must also meet the test of concrete-
ness and novelty before its author is entitled to quasi contractual recovery.").
91. See, e.g., Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[Ilt is now accepted that recovery may be had wholly apart from
contract where there has been 'undue advantage through unfair conduct-a breach
of confidence [or] reprehensible means of obtaining the valuable property rights of
[Vol. 18
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5. The Confidential Relationship Theory
The courts sometimes use the confidential relationship between
the parties to protect the plaintiff's submission of an idea to the de-
fendant. 92 Such a relationship is usually found in an employer-em-
ployee situation, but is certainly not limited to these relationships.
As set forth in the Restatement of Trusts:
A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has
gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise
with the other's interest in mind. A confidential relation may exist
although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to ex-
ist where there is a family relation or one of friendship or such a
relation of confidence as that which arises between physician and
patient or priest and penitent. 93
One commentator argues that the confidential relationship theory
should be subsumed by traditional trade secret law.94 This argu-
ment ignores the fact that the theory is applicable even where the
idea may not be wholly secret.9 5 For example, where the plaintiff
discovered a little known public domain folk song and disclosed it to
the defendant, the court held that the defendant could not exploit
the song without the plaintiff's authorization due to the parties' con-
fidential relationship.96
Some courts apply the theory only where the parties have an ex-
press or implied agreement to treat the idea in confidence.97 Other
courts have applied the theory regardless of an agreement between
another without compensation."); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp.
451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[Elven if the plaintiff has no property right in an idea,
and even though no express or implied-in-fact contract for the sale or use of such an
idea has been established, the defendant may, in appropriate circumstances, never-
theless be found liable to the plaintiff in quasi contract on a theory of unjust
enrichment.").
92. See, e.g., Davies v. Krasna, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1966); Jones v. Ulrich,
95 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950).
93. Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Cal. 1975) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. (b)).
94. Barrett, supra note 7, at 741 ("It is unclear why the confidential relationship
theor[y] of idea law should be necessary. Adequate protection should be available to
deserving plaintiffs through trade secret law.").
95. See, e.g., Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1972) (holding the-
ory applies to materials embodied in letters, lectures, sermons or addresses); Radium
Remedies Co. v. Weiss, 173 Minn. 342, 217 N.W. 339 (1928) (holding qualified or
partial secrecy is sufficient to invoke the theory).
96. Walters v. Shari Music Publishing Corp., 185 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
97. See, e.g., Sloan v. Mud Products, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Okla. 1953);
Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 32 F. Supp. 502 (W.D.N.Y. 1940). These courts
held that while the plaintiffs were required to show that the ideas were both novel
and disclosed in confidence under circumstances which contemplated compensation,
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the parties.98 The latter view is preferable, and the distinction is im-
portant for two reasons. First, a pure breach of confidential relation-
ship action is an equitable action. This permits equitable remedies
such as an injunction and an accounting in addition to equitable de-
fenses such as laches.99 Second, the statute of limitations applicable
to an equitable action may be longer than the period for a breach of
contract or quasi-contract.t00
B. The Novelty, Concreteness and Unauthorized Use Requirement
Regardless of which theory a plaintiff pursues, courts will generally
protect only ideas that are both novel and concrete. Courts usually
discard this requirement when they find an express contract,' 0 ' but
some courts require these elements under that theory as well.o2 Ad-
ditionally, a defendant's use of the idea must be unauthorized. Un-
fortunately, courts have not been uniform in defining these
requirements.
1. The Novelty Requirement
Courts uniformly deny recovery to an idea originator unless the
idea is sufficiently novel.10 3 From a policy standpoint, the novelty
requirement serves to confine protection to those ideas that are truly
valuable to society.104 While this policy is appropriate, it is question-
98. See, e.g., Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 310 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1957)
(holding that a confidential relationship was created when an advertising idea was
disclosed to defendant with the expectation that defendant would pay for its use);
Davies v. Krasna, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1966) (reversing trial court's granting of
nonsuit on a confidential relationship theory).
99. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.06, at 16-48.
100. See Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1975) (holding that statute of limi-
tations to be applied is determined by the nature of the rights sued on, not by the
form of the action or the relief demanded).
101. See, e.g., Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966).
102. See, e.g., Boop v. Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Ind. 1959), aff'd,
278 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1960); Masline v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 112 A. 639
(Conn. 1921).
103. See, e.g., Ed Graham Prods., Inc. v. NBC, Inc., 347 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that "where plaintiff's idea is wholly lacking in novelty, no
cause of action in contract or tort can stand based upon the alleged misappropriation
of that idea.").
104. Barrett, supra note 7, at 710.
Only if the idea is truly valuable to society could the benefit of protection,
which theoretically served as an incentive to create the idea, be deemed suf-
ficient to offset the necessary impairment to competition that results when-
ever individual rights are recognized. While there is no objective, uniform
way to measure the value of an idea, some standards may be more successful
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able whether the novelty requirement adequately serves this
purpose.
The greatest problem arises from the variety of ways the courts
have defined "novel." Generally, depending on the jurisdiction,
courts have found an idea to be "novel" if it was original to the plain-
tiff, innovative in character, or both original to the plaintiff and inno-
vative in character.105 Obviously, the first definition is broader than
the second, and the second definition is broader than the third. For
example, an idea original to the plaintiff may already be in the public
domain, but an idea that is "innovative," by definition, is not.'0 6
The problem is compounded by the originality requirement.
Some courts require ideas to be both original and novel' 0 7 while
other courts use the terms interchangeably.108 This problem may be
illusory since, as Professor Nimmer points out, "it would seem that
requiring both novelty and originality adds nothing to merely requir-
ing novelty since if an idea is novel it must by definition also be
original."109
The definition of "novel" may best be discerned by observing
what ideas the courts consider novel. For example, ideas relating to
advertising and promotional activities have been found to be suffi-
ciently novel, o as have the subject matter of magazine articles"'
and the design and composition of manufactured products.11 2
"[I]deas that reflect 'genuine novelty and invention' are fully pro-
tected against unauthorized use.""l3 On the other hand, the idea
that a business can realize greater profits by increasing the price of
105. Id. at 710-11 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 711.
107. See, e.g., Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953)
(plaintiff claimed CBS copied radio program created by plaintiff); Kovacs v. Mutual
Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1950) (affirming plaintiff's claim that his idea
and format of a radio program were original and novel).
108. See, e.g., Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207 (lth Cir.
1982) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that he had an "exclusive" story about Elvis Pres-
ley's death being related to prescription drugs on grounds that it was neither novel
nor original); Bergman v. Electrolux Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Nev. 1983) (stat-
ing that novelty pertains to originality).
109. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.08[B], at 16-59 n.39.
110. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (holding
that idea was sufficiently novel and concrete to support claim for damages incurred
by appellant's appropriation of a particular type of radio program that appellee had
made known to defendant).
11. See, e.g., Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding that author's copyrighted article was sufficiently novel and concrete to
support claim for infringement, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment).
112. See, e.g., Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 259 A.2d 443 (Pa. 1969).
113. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988)
(quoting Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970)).
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its products is not sufficiently novel; 114 nor is the idea that Elvis Pres-
ley was murdered 115 or an advertisement which depicts a young child
eating yogurt in a high chair.'16
2. The Concreteness Requirement
Courts have shown even more uncertainty in defining "concrete-
ness" than they have in defining "novelty."t17 There appears to be
two general approaches to defining concreteness. Some courts focus
on the form of the idea and determine that the idea is concrete only
if it is in a "tangible form."" 8 Other courts focus on the develop-
ment of the idea and determine that the idea is concrete only if it is
ready for immediate use." 9 In practice, the latter approach gener-
ally encompasses the former, since most courts are not likely to find
an idea ready for immediate use unless the idea is in a tangible
form. 120
There are problems with both approaches. For example, some
courts require an idea to be in writing before it is considered "tangi-
ble."121 This position has been severely criticized:
[T]he better and probably more generally accepted view is that an
idea may be sufficiently developed so as to be concrete without
ever having been on paper. Certainly writing should not be deter-
minative on the question of concreteness since a totally abstract
idea may be put on paper and a highly developed and detailed
'idea' may be presented orally.12 2
The "ready for immediate use" approach, on the other hand, rede-
fines the definition of "idea." "If we think of an idea as 'a concep-
tion[,] . . . a preliminary plan,' then surely to speak of an idea
114. Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 A.D. 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y.
609 (1923).
115. Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207 (11 th Cir. 1982).
116. Bram v. Dannon Milk Products, Inc., 33 A.D.2d 1010 (N.Y. 1970).
117. Barrett, supra note 7, at 712.
118. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ("An
abstract idea . . .is so unattached as to be deemed legally without the quality of
individual identity or property."); O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, 68 F. Supp. 13, 14
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) ("[A]n author has no property right in his ideas unless the same are
given embodiment in a tangible form.").
119. See, e.g., Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 665 (Nev. 1975) ("An idea in
order to meet the test of concreteness must be ready for immediate use without any
additional embellishment.").
120. See, e.g., id. ("The purpose of the test is to insure that the idea merits protec-
tion: That it is 'tangible' and would not exist but for the independent efforts of the
author.").
121. See, e.g., Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Mun.
Ct. 1948) (holding that advertising idea submitted orally not tangible); Silver v. Tele-
vision City, Inc., 215 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965) (holding that television show is a
"literary" production).
122. 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.08[A], at 16-53 to 16-54 (citations omitted).
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developed to the point where it is ready for use presents a contradic-
tion in terms since if an idea is so developed it ceases to be merely an
idea. " 123
3. The Unauthorized Use Requirement
Most courts that address the issue of idea protection merely con-
centrate on the novelty and concreteness criteria.124 Indeed, even
the major commentators in the field limit their discussion to these
two criteria.125 This probably occurs because the novelty and con-
creteness requirements apply to the idea itself. However, before a
plaintiff can recover from the defendant under any of the theories of
recovery, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's use was
unauthorized. 126
While most courts simply imply the unauthorized use criterion,
some courts expressly make this an additional requirement. For ex-
ample, in Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co.,127 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized that, under New York law, recovery for
the misappropriation of an idea is permitted if the idea is novel, the
idea is in concrete form, and the defendant makes unathorized use of
the idea.128 To show unauthorized use, the plaintiff must demon-
strate "some substantial similarity" between the plaintiff's idea and
the idea used by the defendant.129
IV. THE ISSUE OF PREEMPTION
"Preemption" is defined as a "[djoctrine adopted by [the] U.S.
Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of such a national, as
opposed to local, character that federal laws preempt or take prece-
dent over state laws. As such, a state may not pass a law inconsistent
with the federal law."130 The preemption doctrine finds its roots in
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 131
Two federal bodies of laws overlap the area of idea law: patent law
123. Id. at 16-53 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1236 (2d ed. 1983)).
124. See, e.g., Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir.
1946) (holding employer liable for reasonable value of use of inventive ideas dis-
closed by employee who had expectation of payment).
125. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER, supra note 7; Barrett, supra note 7.
126. Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1982) (re-
jecting plaintiff's claim of novelty in "exclusive story").
127. Id. at 1210.
128. Id.; see also Galanis v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34, 38 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (holding that plaintiff must establish that the idea was actually appropriated by
the defendants).
129. Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 969 (Cal. 1953), quoted
in Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990).
131. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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and copyright law. Both are statutory, finding their roots in the Con-
stitution.1i 2 The United States Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of patent and copyright preemption on several occasions, with
seemingly contradictory results.
A. Patent Law Preemption
Obtaining a patent is the normal means of protecting an idea. In-
deed, some commentators have suggested that a patent is the only
method available to protect ideas.133 A patent can be obtained for
"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."134 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has recognized the "strong federal policy
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protec-
tion."t35 Consequently, while an idea may lead to the invention
or discovery of patentable subject matter, an idea itself is not
patentable. 136
B. Copyright Law Preemption
The 1976 Copyright Act' s 7 expressly preempts any state law that
creates rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103."138 Section 102(b) prohibits the originator of an idea
from securing copyright protection for that idea: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea . . .regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
132. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
133. See, e.g., Lerinda S. Waltrip, Copyright Law--The Idea/Expression Dichotomy:
Where Has It Gone?, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 411, 411 (1987) ("To protect an idea from
unlimited use by the public, the originator must obtain a patent.").
134. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
135. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969).
136. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874), quoted
in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
137. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)
138. Id. § 301(a). The exclusive rights include the rights to reproduce, distribute,
publicly perform and publicly display the copyrighted work, and to make derivative
works based on the copyrighted work. Id. § 106.
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illustrated, or embodied in such work."' 3 9 The crucial issue thus be-
comes whether an idea comes within the scope of section 102.140
Even if ideas fall within the scope of copyrightable subject matter,
most of the theories of idea protection would not be preempted.
Section 301 preempts only state laws that create rights "equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106."141 Indeed, the section expressly permits
"any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any
State with respect to ... activities violating legal or equitable rights
that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106."142 While there is
little case law that directly addresses these issues, the consensus is
that ideas are not only outside the scope of copyrightable subject
matter under section 102, but ideas are also outside the scope of
subject matter under section 301.143
Courts generally apply an "extra element" test to determine
whether a state law is preempted. "[W]hen a state law violation is
predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere repro-
duction or the like, the rights involved are not equivalent and pre-
emption will not occur."' 4 4
The express and implied contract theories include the element of a
contractual relationship, thus effectively removing them from the
scope of preemption.'45 Similarly, the confidential relationship the-
139. Id. § 102(b)(3).
140. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 16.04[C], at 16-24 to 16-25 ("It is arguable that
an idea for a literary work does fall 'within the subject matter of copyright as specified
in section 102 and 103.' "). This is certainly a reasonable interpretation, based on
the courts' preemption of state laws regarding historical facts, themes and research,
which have been deliberately excluded from the scope of copyright. See, e.g., Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 149
(D.D.C. 1980).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
142. Id. § 301(b)(3) (emphasis added).
143. See, e.g., Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1532
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[s]tate laws that protect ideas, as distinct from their expres-
sion, are without the subject matter of copyright and therefore not preempted under
§ 301."); Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("Copyright
protection extends only to expression of an idea, not the idea itself.... Since the
claims now being considered are not entitled to protection under the Act, they are
not preempted by the Act.") (emphasis in original).
144. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200. The "extra element" must be one which
makes a qualitative difference in the nature of the action. "Elements such as aware-
ness or intent, which alter the action's scope but not its nature, will not save it from
preemption under § 301." Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535.
145. See, e.g., Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981, 986
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Breach of contract claim is "qualitatively different from a copyright
claim and therefore not preempted by § 301.").
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ory includes the obligation not to disclose an idea revealed in confi-
dence.146 There is a split of opinion regarding the quasi-contract
theory; some courts find an extra element in the theoryt47 while
other courts fail to find any element which renders this count differ-
ent from copyright infringement.14 8 The property theory, on the
other hand, does not contain the requisite additional element. Con-
sequently, any claim brought under the property theory will be pre-
empted unless the court determines that ideas fall within the scope
of copyright subject matter.1
49
C. Intellectual Property Preemption Case Law
The Supreme Court first addressed the preemption doctrine in an
intellectual property context in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 150
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,151 two similar cases de-
cided on the same day. In the Sears and Compco decisions, the Court
determined that Congress had reached a compromise when it
drafted the patent statute: inventions that were truly novel and non-
obvious (i.e., patentable) would be granted a monopoly of limited
duration while inventions which failed to satisfy the patent criteria
should remain in the common domain. 152 Under this reasoning, any
state law that protected an inventor whose invention was not patent-
able would frustrate Congress's intent and was thus preempted.
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent
the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to
be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the pub-
lic something which federal law has said belongs to the public. The
result would be that.. . States could allow perpetual protection to
articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all under fed-
eral constitutional standards. This would be too great an en-
146. See, e.g., Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (hold-
ing that party may contract to pay for ideas even though they could not be protected
by copyright law), aft'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
147. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 945
(W.D. Tex. 1982); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). These cases hold that quasi-contract and implied contract claims
are significantly different from federal copyright claims.
148. P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383, 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1984); see also
Ronald Litoff, Ltd., 621 F. Supp. at 986 (finding that plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrich-
ment was preempted because it involved "the same rights ... which plaintiffs seek to
protect in their copyright claim").
149. Barrett, supra note 7, at 725 ("Should the higher courts ultimately determine
that ideas are within the statutory subject matter, the property theory should be pre-
empted pursuant to Section 301 of the Copyright Act.").
150. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
151. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
152. Id. at 237-38.
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croachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.15 3
The Court took a different approach in its next two opinions on
the issue. In Goldstein v. California 154 and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp. ,155 the Court determined that when Congress failed to provide
protection for a particular type of intellectual property under the
patent and copyright statutes, it left that field unattended and open
to state regulation. In Kewanee the Court decided that "[t]he only
limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this
area passed by Congress."' 156
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of idea protection
in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. '57 In Aronson, the plaintiff devel-
oped a unique keyholder and entered into a royalty agreement with
the defendant. The agreement required the defendant to pay royal-
ties to the plaintiff whether or not the keyholder was patentable.
When the United States Patent Office refused to issue a patent for
the keyholder, the defendant sought to repudiate the agreement,
claiming that enforcement of the agreement was preempted by the
patent statutes. The Supreme Court disagreed.158
The Court first recognized that statutes "seek to assure that ideas
in the public domain remain there for the use of the public."' 15 9 The
153. Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 231-32. The Court came close to addressing the
protection of ideas in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). While the Lear deci-
sion directly addressed the issue of licensee estoppel, the Court raised the issue of
whether and to what extent states "may protect the owners of unpatented inventions
who are willing to disclose their ideas to manufacturers only upon payment of royal-
ties." Id. at 674 (emphasis in original). The Court declined to answer this question,
but did recognize the "conflicting demands" involved:
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his
promises simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he
has made. On the other hand, federal law requires that all ideas in general
circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
valid patent.
Id. at 668.
154. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
155. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
156. Id. at 479; see also Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570. The pre-1976 Copyright Act did
not include sound recordings within the scope of copyrightable subject matter; thus,
there was no conflict between federal law and a state law protecting recordings.
"Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no rea-
son exists why the State should not be free to act." Id. The Court in Goldstein ex-
pressly distinguished the protection of ideas. "No restraint has been placed on the
use of an idea or concept; rather, petitioners and other individuals remain free to
record the same compositions in precisely the same manner and with the same per-
sonnel as appeared on the original recording." Id. at 571. The Court did not elabo-
rate on this point.
157. 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
158. Id. at 257.
159. Id. at 262.
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Court concluded that the agreement at issue did not frustrate Con-
gress's intent, since "encouraging Mrs. Aronson to make arrange-
ments for the manufacture of her keyholder furthers the federal
policy of disclosure of inventions."'160 Thus, since the idea behind
the keyholder was not in the public domain before the parties en-
tered into the royalty agreement, the agreement was not preempted
by the patent laws. Indeed, the agreement actually furthered the
policy behind the patent laws by encouraging the disclosure of an
idea which otherwise would not have been disclosed.
This point was reinforced ten years later in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 161 In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Florida Supreme Court's decision that the federal patent
laws preempted a Florida statute that prohibited the use of direct
molding processes to duplicate unpatented boat hulls.
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an
unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely
disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contra-
venes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the
centerpiece of federal patent policy.1
6 2
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized that its decisions since
Sears took a decidedly less rigid view of the scope of federal preemp-
tion under the patent laws.163 The Court also reaffirmed both
Kewanee Oil and Aronson. 16
4
The balance struck by the Court is, in its own words, pragmatic.165
So long as the nondisclosure of an idea does not remove that idea
from the public domain, and thus contravene the purpose of the pat-
ent laws, the disclosure of the idea can be protected by state law.
However, if the idea is "freely disclosed by the author to the public at
large," no state law may interfere with the public's use and enjoy-
ment of that idea.166
V. FUTURE PROTECTION OF IDEAS
It is difficult to predict how the courts will address the issue of
protecting ideas in the future. Given the United States Supreme
Court's reluctance to strictly enforce patent preemption and the
lower courts' tendency toward excluding ideas from copyright sub-
160. Id. at 262-63.
161. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
162. Id. at 156-57.
163. Id. at 156.
164. Id.
165. Id. ("We have since reaffirmed the pragmatic approach which Kewanee takes
to the preemption of state laws dealing with the protection of intellectual
property.").
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ject matter for preemption considerations, it seems probable that the
courts will not preempt a state law which protects ideas. Neverthe-
less, as case law develops and the novelty and concreteness criteria
become more refined, courts may be more hesitant to protect ideas
unless satisfied that the idea is sufficiently new, concrete, and devel-
oped to deserve protection.
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the protection of ideas, both
potential plaintiffs and defendants should take appropriate steps to
protect their respective positions. The best approach for both par-
ties is to document all correspondence and discussions regarding the
disclosure of an idea.
For example, an idea originator should submit the idea in a sepa-
rate envelope. The envelope should contain a warning printed on it
alerting the mail opener that the envelope contains an idea being
disclosed in confidence. Additionally, the idea originator should in-
clude a letter detailing the terms of disclosure and requesting the
return of the envelope unopened if the recipient decides not to agree
with those terms. 167
On the other hand, a business that is likely to receive unsolicited
ideas has a greater exposure to liability and, thus, should take steps
to insulate itself from a potential lawsuit. First, the company should
formulate and articulate a written policy regarding idea submis-
sions.168 Second, the company should designate one person to
whom all unsolicited ideas are routed. 169 Finally, upon receipt of an
idea, the company should send a letter to the submitter which in-
forms him of the company's policies and procedures for handling the
idea. This letter should also inform the submitter of the status of the
parties' relationship and proposed use of the idea.170
VI. CONCLUSION
Several theories of recovery are available to a person who submits
an idea expecting remuneration which never materializes. All of
these theories, however, have substantial barriers which must be
167. See Downey v. General Foods, 323 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1971) (providing an exam-
ple of an idea submission form); rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.E.2d 257 (1971). 2
ALEXANDER LINDEY, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS 1318-19
(2d ed. 1981) (providing an example of a letter accompanying the submission of an
idea).
168. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 159 (1985). This pol-
icy should "set forth in detail the procedures that will be followed whenever the com-
pany receives an idea or suggestion from the public. A company's written policy
regarding idea submissions should be distributed and made known to all employ-
ees." Id.
169. Id. at 160.
170. See, e.g., 2 LINDEY, supra note 167, at 1315-17 (providing an example of a
letter to be sent to an idea submitter).
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overcome before a court will award recovery. To avoid the uncer-
tainty and additional cost of litigation, both potential plaintiffs and
defendants should take appropriate steps to ensure that the other
party is fully aware of the agreement surrounding the disclosure of
an idea. If appropriate steps are taken, idea originators can disclose
their ideas knowing that they will be compensated if the ideas are
used, and idea recipients can receive ideas knowing that they need
not fear litigation if they decide not to use the ideas.
Steve Reitenour
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